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HUMANISTIC CRIMINOLOGY:
IS IT POSSIBLE?
CLAYTON A. HARTJEN 1
RUTGERS UNIVERSITY - NEWARK

ABSTRACT

A humanistic criminology is one that would be
oriented to human betterment and fulfillment,
criminology
to
conventional
as
opposed
crime
and
the
control
of
oriented
to
Some
of
the
of offenders.
suppression
obstacles that stand in the way of developing
a humanistic criminology, as well as some of
the reasons why these obstacles do not
necessarily preclude its being established,
Some reasons why humanistic
are addressed.
are
suggested.
is
desirable
criminology
Given that humanistic criminology is viable a
schools
of
of
contemporary
critique
criminology/criminal justice is offered and a
number of suggestions are made regarding what
criminology
department
of
an
academic
and
humanism
would
study
oriented
to
emphasize in its curriculum and goals.

1. This is a substantially revised and
expanded version of a paper presented at the
American Society of Criminology meetings in
Denver, 1983. My thanks to S. Priyadarsini,
Jayshree Parthasarathy, and Lucile Duberman
for their comments and suggestions.
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INTRODUCTION
A number of years ago Gibson (1970:56)
commented
on
the
underlying
perspective

criminologists have had of their subject
matter and the purposes of their inquiry:
The
assumptions
of
conventional criminology are that
the law and all the apparatus which
supports it can be taken for
granted as a given fact. It could
be, should be, improved this way or
that
as
time
goes
on,
but
nevertheless it represents a norm
which all right-thinking people
support.
Criminals are deviants,
and
it
is
the
duty
of
criminologists to work towards the
end of suppressing crime even if
the ideal of abolishing it may
never be reached.
Although they are not usually explicitly
expressed, these assumptions provided the
philosophical and programatic bases for both
the classical and positivist schools of
criminology from the late eighteenth century
to the present time (see Gibbons, 1979;
Pelfrey, 1980).
Even though the scope,
character,
and
focus
of
criminological
inquiry changed somewhat with the advent of
the labeling perspective and the development
of the conflict, critical, and radical
criminologies
that
emerged
during
the
1960s-1970s,
the
fundamental
nature
of
criminological
inquiry
has
not
been
substantially altered. Praxis was advocated,
445

new villains (e.g., corporate criminals, the
police)
were
brought forward
as worthy
objects of criminological attention, and new
topics of inquiry
(law and the criminal
justice system) became popular.
However, a
"correctional" orientation still dominates
criminological
thinking
and
activities.
Employing methods of scientific inquiry and
geared to improving the criminal justice
system (making it more effective, efficient,
and/or
fair,
not to
speak
of "just"),
contemporary criminology is still primarily
concerned with explaining the causes of
criminality and finding ways to prevent or
reduce
the
frequency of
criminal
acts.
Contemporary criminology has largely been
justified in terms of an ideology which holds
that through the accumulation of scientific
knowledge
about
crime,
its
causes
and
control, criminology can "save us," either
from the criminal or unfair justice (Reasons,
1975).
Thus, by emulating the physical
sciences
and
accepting
as
given
the
deterministic assumptions of positivism, the
pursuit
of
empirical
truth,
numeric
information,
system
management
and
improvement, and personnel
training have
become
the
hallmarks
of
modern
correctional-oriented
criminology/criminal
justice. Understanding the human phenomenon
of crime is,
at best, a secondary and
marginal concern.
It is my purpose in this paper to
emphasize this secondary and marginal concern
by articulating what I believe to be the
characteristics
and prospects of
a new
criminology -- a humanistic criminology. To
do so, I shall address three issues: (1) the
characteristic
features
of
a humanistic
criminology,
(2)
the
possibilities
for
developing such an enterprise, and (3) what
an
academic
department
of
criminology
oriented to humanistic considerations might
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look like.

DEFINING HUMANISTIC CRIMINOLOGY
What are the distinguishing features of
a humanistic criminology?
What would a
humanistic criminology address, do, value,
and seek to achieve?
Given the rather
diverse and not always clearly specified
versions of humanism expressed by the members
of various social scientific disciplines
(primarily sociology and psychology) this is
not as easy or noncontroversial a question as
might be imagined.
Based upon the various characterizations
of humanism expressed by a number of writers
(e.g., Gouldner, 1970: 481-513; Lee, 1987;
Gella, Jansen, & Sabo, Jr., 1978; Tifft &
Sullivan, 1980; and Young, 1984) I would
suggest
that
in
contrast
to
a
correctional-criminology
oriented
to
the
scientific discovery of the causes and cures
of crime, a humanistic criminology is a
criminology
that
is
also
oriented
to
individual freedom and enjoyment of life,
while striving to protect and promote human
dignity and survival. Humanistic criminology
is an active enterprise dedicated to social
change
and
betterment.
And
it
is
fundamentally oriented to improving the human
condition, not only in terms of technological
advances but in terms of personal and social
fulfillment
as
well.
In
pursuing
this
course,
humanistic
criminology
is
also
existential and relative, as opposed to
empirical and deterministic, in that it is
concerned with the experiencing of life
rather than mere description and explanation
of
"social
facts"
or
human
behaviors.
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Moreover, it is value committed, rather than
value neutral, but strives for objectivity in
matters of fact and truth.
It is skeptical
of
scientific
claims,
but
it
is
not
necessarily anti-scientific. It is, instead,
opposed to "scientism" (as depicted by Lee,
1978).
Thus, a humanistic criminology would
be
people-centered,
ethical,
critical,
oriented to ameliorating social adversity,
and dedicated to undermining the myths and
rationalizations that have been and continue
to be employed to maintain and justify the
position and privileges of the elites in
human societies (Lee, 1978:94; 1980:5; also
see Pepinsky & Jesilow, 1984; Young, 1984).
Such
a
criminology
would
(indeed,
should) continue to employ scientific methods
of research, but it would not be scientific
in the traditional "positivistic" notions of
science.
Instead, "rather than trying to
find out what is, the humanist uses data to
calculate what =n be"(Pepinsky, 1979:250).
Indeed, scientific methods of data collection
are ways of systematically and purposively
experiencing the social and natural worlds,
although they are not necessarily the only
viable or possible ways of acquiring such
experience
(see
Hartjen,
1981).
Many
humanistic-criminologists
do
employ
scientific research techniques
as useful
tools in gaining the kind of understanding
they need to pursue their goal of human
fulfillment
and
betterment.
Using
the
techniques of science does not prevent one
from being a humanist.
It is not the
"technique" so much as the attitude one has
in employing it that distinguishes between a
humanistic versus a "scientism" approach in
criminology. That is, it is not how one goes
about acquiring knowledge as it is the kinds
of understanding one pursues and what one
does
with
it
that
separates
the
criminological humanist from the agent of
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social control.
Also, while law and its administration
would
remain
central
topics
for
criminological
analyses,
a
humanistic
criminology would u
be oriented to
political anarchy, to the abolition of law,
or, more correctly, the need for its coercive
force (see Black, 1976; 1980).
In this
regard, a humanistic criminology would be
sensitive to topics such as racism, sexism,
and militarism (as suggested by Herman &
Julia Schwendinger, 1970). However, it would
continue to retain a "legal" definition of
crime, for it is only by so doing that the
political (legal) nature of crime as a
construct in the service of elites could be
highlighted.
Insofar as law (especially
criminal law) is used to justify exploitation
or does not itself provide or help to secure
an improved human condition, it is the duty
of humanistic criminology to critique the
legal order and to reveal its antihuman
structures. The definition of crime used by
political authorities
(legal definitions)
facilitates accomplishing this task by, on
the one hand, revealing the persons and
behaviors such authorities seek to repress
and, on the other hand, exposing what they
choose to promote or sanction (see Hartjen,
1972; also see Quinney, 1979; Chambliss,
1984).
A number of criminologists
already
practice
some
version
of
humanistic
criminology, wittingly or not.
And many
others have made important contributions
central to the concerns of criminological
humanists.
Thus,
while
it would
be
inappropriate to associate criminological
humanism
with
any
specific
works
or
individuals in this essay, and while some of
us
even
call
ourselves
humanists
or
mn iQ
criminologists, the
issue of
449

is not
concern here is not who is or
humanistic but that of assessing whether a
By
is
possible?
crminlogy
bhianis
as
or
achievable,
"doable,"
possible, I mean
a viable intellectual enterprise rather than
an individual endeavor on the part of some
its
given
Moreover,
criminologists.
plausibility, what would such a criminology
look like?

THE POSSIBILITY OF HUMANISTIC CRIMINOLOGY

There are at least three different
answers to the central question posed here:
(1) a negative answer NO, (2) a positive
answer YES, and (3) a HUMANISTIC answer.

THE NEGATIVE CASE

Undoubtedly a host of obstacles stand in
the way of a humanistic criminology. Among
these are three reasons why some people may
feel that the kind of humanistic criminology
described above is not possible, or at least
a
such
One,
develop.
to
likely
not
criminology is adverse to governmental and
(1970)
Kennedy
As
interests.
political
notes, crime is a political phenomenon,
essential to the maintenance of the political
Thus, insofar as the creation of
state.
crime is a major means of governmental social
control (Black, 1976), governments are not
likely to support, and may actually resist an
one
criminology,
value-committed
active,
and
freedom,
dedicated to change, betterment,
hand,
other
the
On
justice.
social
"scientific" criminology is well-suited to
450

the interests of government. Officials want
data about offenders, systems, and outcomes.
Primarily, they want facts that may be
ignored or used as needed to maintain control
and
dominance
(Quinney, 1974;
Jackson,
1984).
Humanistic criminologists would not
only refrain from providing such information,
but
the whole
humanistic tradition is
directly opposed to so doing.
Indeed,
humanistic criminology would be oriented to
questioning and investigating government,
especially with regard to its role in the
crime-creation process.
Financial support
from the government to pursue this activity
is therefore not likely to be forthcoming,
and without such support the criminological
enterprise is jeopardized.
Second, as Sylvester (1975: 224) points
out, criminology, regardless of type or form,
inevitably deals with questions of right and
wrong. The only credence people are likely
to give to any statements criminologists
might make about such questions (above and
beyond their proclivity to agree beforehand
with any of them) is that our statements are
valid depictions of objective reality; an
assessment of our truth-claims that is not
likely to be made unless such claims are
cloaked
in
the
robe
of
scientific
respectability. Thus, to the extent that we
want to be listened to, heard, and to some
extent make a difference, departing from
scientific objectivity (i.e., being openly
value
committed)
detracts
from
that
achievement. A discipline, however noble and
well intended, is not likely to survive as a
discipline for very long if no one listens or
values what its members have to say.
Third, humanistic criminology may also
face internal defeat. A criminology that is
committed and actively oriented to achieving
good and to improving the human condition
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invariably encounters the problem of deciding
what values are to be pursued -- what
constitutes an improved human condition. For
example, is it our purpose to (a) rid the
streets of drug dealers, (b) successfully
rehabilitate drug addicts, (c) see to it that
users
receive
their
constitutional
drug
rights, (d) promote the right of addicts to
use drugs as they want as a humanistic right
to pursue the enjoyment of life as they see
it, or (e) all of the above? Moreover, how
active should we be in pursuing any of these
goals, or how are we to go about doing so at
all? Are we to be scholar-activists; and, if
so, what are the limits of our activism?
Even now criminology is torn between those
who think human betterment could be achieved
if more lawbreakers were put behind bars or
kept there for longer periods of time,
whereas others argue that we should tear down
the walls -- either of prisons or the
capitalist state (see Inciardi, 1980 for
To the
discussions of these various views).
to
not
likely
are
criminologists
extent that
concur on the basic agenda for a humanistic
criminology (or, indeed, over the way I have
characterized it here), it is not likely that
in such an
they would actually engage
enterprise as an organized discipline.

THE POSITIVE CASE
Regardless of the kinds of obstacles one
might envision, it is possible to achieve a
of
for a number
humanistic
criminology
society,
contemporary
in
One,
reasons.
"science" may have lost some of its aura and
the respect it received from the general
many
scientists).
public
(as
well
as
from the
Although technological advances
computer chip to nuclear energy have done
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much to change the quality of physical life,
these changes have not always or necessarily
been
for
the
better.
Word-processing
machines may make it less physically onerous
to produce written documents, but they hardly
compensate for life with "the bomb." People
are becoming skeptical about the credibility
of scientific claims or its ability to
actually uncover valid information. In fact,
such skepticism is engendered by the very
nature of the scientific enterprise itself.
In criminology, for instance, squabbling over
how best to measure crime rates, whether or
not lower-class people are really more
criminal than more privileged persons, or
whether the crime problem can be solved
through mandatory sentencing policies or more
funds for rehabilitation may not only be
viewed by the lay public as exercises in
intellectual trivia in many cases but does
little
to
install
confidence
in the
conclusions
reached
by
conventional
criminology.
People have also become more educated
and sophisticated.
They now realize that
Lundberg's (1947) claim that science (social
or
otherwise)
can
save
us
was
an
overstatement, to say the least.
Science
cannot answer all questions or solve all
problems.
In fact, science may have done
much to generate many of the problems people
now face (such as "the bomb," overpopulation,
and chemical contaminants).
And science
seems to have made few inroads in reducing
the appeal of religious dogma and the bigotry
espoused by various "moral entrepreneurs.'
In this respect, the cloak of science may not
be as necessary to a viable criminology as
some believe or as it may have been at one
time. Perhaps it is not how scientifically
valid our statements are that counts, but how
meaningful they are to the people who hear
them (see Lynd, 1936 and Lazarsfeld, et al.,
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1967).
Second, money is nice, but it is not
essential
to
criminological
inquiry
or
One can and many people have
activities.
done research in criminology without large
government grants or extensive financial
Indeed, excellent criminological
backing.
insights and thought have been expressed by
who
were
not
numerous
criminologists
necessarily subsidized by some funding agency
or institution. Conversely, in spite of the
peer review process, large sums of money
poured into a research project do not
guarantee the quality or relevance of the
results. Besides my own experiences working
for government agencies, a number of other
people employed in such agencies have also
told me that their research often has little,
if anything, to to do with the discovery of
or
interesting
scientifically
valid
information. Instead, emphasis is placed on
keeping the agency "in business' and not
making waves. In some instances the results
of such research may even be suppressed when
is politically
or
bureaucratically
it
inexpedient to allow public dissemination.
Lack of government support would, of
course, hinder members of the discipline.
But it may also liberate them. And it may
stimulate
the
creativity
and
help
to
reflective thought essential to the pursuit
of knowledge and understanding. Even then,
of resources that
there are a number
criminologists have largely left untapped in
their quest for funds in the service of the
agencies of law and governmental control.
And if being heard is essential to a
humanistic criminology, but the lack of a
national sample or an appropriate "This
research was funded by ..." citation inhibits

publication
in
established
humanistic publications are by
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journals,
no means

unknown. And as some humanistically-oriented
criminologists
have
come
to
realize,
ultimately there is also the soapbox, the
political caucus, and the duplicating machine
at our disposal.
If what we say is worth
saying, someone will eventually hear us.
Third, humanistic criminologists may not
agree among themselves as to the dimensions
or agenda of the field.
But little such
agreement
has
ever
been
found
in
the
discipline anyway. Dispute is inevitable and
healthy, whether one is talking about crime
control versus due process, regression versus
correlation analysis, praxis, or survival.
Humanistic criminologists have a place and a
stake in the disputes that concern our lives,
both within and outside criminology.
Not
getting into the ruckus, not playing the
game, not hustling our own point of view or
interests guarantees that others will express
and secure theirs. We may not know or agree
on what "a better human condition" looks
like, but it is not likely to get any better
by doing nothing.
As Pepinsky (1979:250)
states: "Human beings do not have to do
research to find out what it takes to conform
to the world as it is.
Instead, the species
who have even created the idea of God in
their own heads can create ideas of how the
species can build new ways of life in their
changing environments."
It is the task of
humanistic criminology to help create these
ideas
and
to
show
how
they
might be
implemented, not to dictate the ways of life
we are to choose.

A HUMANISTIC ANSWER
Regardless
of
its
practicality
or
ultimate form, a humanistic criminology is
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possible for the very simple reason that it
In the first place, as a
is necessary.
discipline
of
knowledge
and
action
criminology must be humanistic, in large part
because of the very subject matter with which
it deals. To be anything else would be at
best androidic and at worst barbaric. Right
and wrong, crime and justice, punishment and
freedom are not trivial matters.
They are
central to the very essence of human life.
Taking another's life, either in the form of
a crime or legal execution, is not an
occasion for bland unconcern.
Although one
should be objective in assessing or gathering
facts
concerning
such matters,
if
only
because
securing
reasonably
accurate
information requires such a stance, to be
purely objective, to be purely pragmatic, to
be
simply
interested
in
"truth"
when
confronted with criminal matters is to deny
the very humanness of the criminological
enterprise.
As physicians must retain a
sense
of
detachment
when
dealing
with
patients (to apparently deflect the cultural
taboos regarding physical intimacy or to keep
their
balance
among
the
horrors
they
routinely must face) criminologists also may
be required to develop a similar attitude.
But as with the physician, to be uncaring,
unemotional
unfeeling,
unsympathetic,
or
about our subject matter and the human beings
with whom it is concerned is to be inhuman.
Although there are probably few if any
criminologists
who
actually
fit
this
description, the ethos of humanism as opposed
to scientism maintains that such detachment
is both unnecessary and unwarranted.
Second, what has scientific criminology
(in the restricted sense) done any way?
Essentially none of the main questions or
concerns of scientific criminology have been
answered or accomplished.
To again quote
Pepinsky (1979:250):
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... ostensibly new discoveries
about
crime
turn
out,
upon
historical reflection, to look just
like old discoveries in a former
heyday for partisans of a competing
truth about crime.
Give it a
century or two to grow, and the
course of development of positivist
knowledge
takes
on
an
awful
banality, provoking pessimism and
cynicism
about
human
beings'
capacity to shape their social
destiny.

If anything, the major accomplishment of
scientific criminology has been one that is
central to a humanistic orientation or point
of

view

--

the

politicalization

of

criminological thought. After more than a
century of failing to prove that criminals
are somehow different from (and inferior to)
noncriminals, some criminologists have come
to realize that criminals are not the central
subject of the field anyway.
Rather, as
Quinney (1980) and Turk (1982) suggest, it is
the political nature of the crime-creation
process, indeed, the political nature of
crime
as
such
that
is of
principle
criminological concern.
Such a concern is
eminently humanistic.
It is humanistic
because it directs our attention to the
fundamental human condition, the social,
economic, and political relations of persons
in societies
that
not
only
engender
criminality (both legally prohibited and
condoned) but also necessitate as well as
facilitate the use of formal, repressive
means of social control.
The political
individualization of responsibility and its
sanctification in law provided not only for
the
creation
of
crime,
but
for
the
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criminological investigation of the very
conditions of privilege and oppression that
necessitated crime's creation in the first
place.
And this, perhaps, is why humanistic
criminology is essential. That is, without a
criminology is a
humanistic orientation
humanism,
Without
enterprise.
sterile
criminology would do little more than crank
descriptions of criminals,
out numbers,
of
programs, and conflicting
evaluations
strategies to solve the crime problem -- with

little meaning or purpose beyond maintaining
or enhancing positions of dominance and
and
methods
Scientific
privilege.
techniques, of course, are among the tools we
may use to gain experience and hopefully the
understanding we need to achieve human
betterment. But, positive science provides
neither the basis or the essential condition
for achieving criminological understanding.
Crime and crime control are human and not
merely behavioral or social phenomena. As
heart of
very
humanism is the
such,
humanistic
a
short,
In
criminology.
criminology is, of course, possible because
no other kind of criminology would be worth
pursuing.

DOING HUMANISTIC CRIMINOLOGY

criminology
humanistic
Theoretically
could be practiced wherever criminologists
conducting
whether
craft,
their
pursue
research, providing technical or consultant
or
programs,
administering
services,
teaching. In practice, outside the academic
setting, criminologists have little chance to
pursue the goals of humanism insofar as they
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largely work for government agencies that are
more
concerned
with
crime
control or
efficiency
than
they
are
with
human
betterment.
Thus,
as with criminological
activities generally, humanistic criminology
is likely to find its home in the college and
university, primarily in academic schools,
departments, or programs of criminology,
criminal justice, or some euphemism for
"police
science."
Such
schools
have
blossomed in the past decade throughout the
system of higher education in America and are
found in academic settings throughout the
world. Although varying greatly in emphasis
and curriculum, a separate and distant
discipline
made
up
of
"criminologists"
appears to have taken root.
But what is the program pursued by this
discipline? Based on an informal, nonrandom
(i.e., unscientific) sampling of graduate and
undergraduate
catalogues
and
course
descriptions, departments of criminal justice
or criminology tend to be oriented to one or
both

of

two

basic

pursuits

--

criminal

justice research or management. Although it
is well
known
that
college
catalogue
descriptions of courses and course offerings
have little to do with reality and that it is
impossible to discern what is actually taught
in a course from its course descriptions, it
appears
clear
that
graduate
schools
particularly
(but
some
undergraduate
departments also) are heavily oriented to
producing criminal justice "scientists" who
are well trained in research methods and
statistics
(particularly
involving
the
acquisition of computer skills).
Although
the
members
of
these
departments
are
undoubtedly concerned with producing scholars
modeled after the social and behavioral
sciences, the skills and knowledge students
in these departments receive is well suited
to
employment
opportunities
in
459

criminal-justice agencies of various kinds.
Purposively or not, such departments are
management
criminal-justice
producing
organize,
can
who
persons
experts,
banks,
data
interpret
and
administer,
generate evaluation reports, establish and
implement certification standards, or act in
higher-level
to
capacity
an
advisory
administrators (see Quinney, 1980: 13-15).
Many of these departments also appear to
be oriented to offering a diverse number of
in
courses
as
described
best
courses
"Handcuffing 101" that are geared either to
the
in
work
to
persons
training
lower-level
at
often
criminal-justice field,
starting positions, or to gain promotion
credits for those already employed in it.
Students taking such courses (except for
those who desire "gut course" credits or are
"interestedn)
enrolled because they are
normally are looking for the training and
credentials they need to become police
officers, probation or parole officers,
kinds of
other
attorneys, or
criminal
Although by taking
crime-control experts.
the
and
"The Police
as
courses
such
Community," "The Juvenile Justice System,"
criminal-justice
and "Parole Procedures,"
majors may in fact wind up being better
criminal-justice workers, the intellectual
they
liberalization
and
sophistication
experience by undertaking a liberal arts
degree may well have a greater humanizing
effect than any of the criminology/criminal
The
justice courses they may encounter.
point to note is that little by way of
in
contained
apparently
is
humanism
Instead,
criminology-department curricula.
the emphasis is on training experts in the
business of crime control, a purpose that
in a
significance
little
find
would
Indeed, as Young
humanistic discipline.
(1984: 12) suggests:
460

Rather
than
seeking
to
motivate, train and place students
in the criminal justice system,
should
critically
criminology
analyze the
systems of social
control in ...

society.

It should

distance itself from any given
system of law, of corrections, of
political philosophy or of economic
endeavor.
En short, the first step in achieving a truly
iumanistic criminology is for criminologists
:o get out of the crime-control business and
Lnto the business of human understanding.
But concretely what would a humanistic
lepartment of criminology look like? What
,inds of courses could be offered and what
:inds of subject matter could be emphasized
)r included? The following represents a bare
ninimum.
For one, a humanistic department of
:riminology would give as much attention to
>hilosophy
and
ethics
as
it does to
itatistics, research methods, and computer
?rograming. Such offerings could not only be
Lncluded in the list of electives, but could
)e required subjects for graduation.
They
:ould include but not be limited to subjects
3uch as the philosophy of punishment; the
?hilosophical, ethical, and moral issues
regarding law and social justice; and the
ethics of
justice
and
law
enforcement
(involving, for example, the ethicality as
3pposed to the simple expedience or necessity
)f plea negotiation).
From the perspective
)f humanism, lectures and seminars on a topic
such as rehabilitation would include more
than discussion of "how to do it.", "does it
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work?", "how cost-effective is it?", and the
like. They could also, or instead, focus on
such matters as "should it be done?", "is it
legitimate or moral?"
and "what forms of
rehabilitative
activity
are
ethical
or
unethical,
regardless
of
their
effectiveness?".
These topics may of course
be addressed in contemporary courses, but I
doubt whether they form the core or central
theme of many.
Most schools of criminology pay special
attention
to
teaching
(at least
at
a
rudimentary
level)
criminal
law
and
procedure.
Such topics would also receive
extensive
attention
in
a
humanistic
criminology.
But,
rather
than
simply
discussing the "technocratics" (e.g., mens
tea) of law, attention could focus on the
social, economic, and political forces that
shape criminal law and its administration, as
well as the consequences which emanate from
its existence.
Insofar as crime is a legal
construct made possible and justified by
criminal law, an understanding of the nature
and implications of law is as crucial to
criminological education as is a knowledge of
the law itself (e.g., Chambliss and Seidman,
1982).
Although the study of criminal behavior
(etiology) would probably find less emphasis
in
humanistic
criminology
than
it
has
traditionally received, to the extent that
such conduct is studied at all, humanistic
criminology could considerably broaden the
scope and purpose of such inquiry.
While
conventional (scientific) criminologists have
been fascinated with the criminality of the
under-classes of society and concerned with
finding ways of controlling such conduct, a
humanistic
perspective
would
direct
our
attention
to
upper-world,
"political,"
governmental, corporate, and various other
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forms of criminality and could broaden our
purpose beyond simply finding ways to "curb"
it but to understanding the larger social
realm in which such conduct proliferates and
the humanistic implications these forms of
criminality have.
Although some rather
significant work has already begun in this
regard (e.g., Geis & Meier, 1977; Clinard &
Yeager, 1980; Turk, 1982) in a humanistic
criminology much more extensive inquiry would
be found.
Conventional course offerings in the
administration of justice tend to lean toward
a "how to do it" variety with little emphasis
on
the
social
and
other
implications
administering justice entails.
In addition
to addressing these implications
(in a
philosophy of justice course perhaps) in a
department of humanistic criminology other
kinds of "how to do it" courses could also be
offered. Such courses could address the task
of revolutionary change, how to achieve
social liberation, and the analysis of
political power and government.
"How to'
courses in the administration of justice,
regardless of how well intended (i.e., its
fair dispensation) they may be, ultimately
serve to perpetuate the status wLjq. They do
so because they give credence to and promote
administrative efficiency on the part of the
political structures that rest on the pillars
of law and which, by their very nature,
underpin existing relationships. Invariably
these relationships advantage some people or
groups over others. Therefore, to the extent
that humanistic criminology is dedicated to
social change, betterment, and justice "how
to" courses in social change are basic to the
education of humanistic criminologists. If
criminology is to be a science at all (which
does not preclude it being humanistic at the
same time) it must be a "political" science
as well as a science of politics and
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government.

CONCLUSION
In
answer
to
the
question:
"Is
humanistic criminology possible?"
we can
offer but one response: "Of course it isl"
But accomplishing it would require change on
the part of the discipline.
This would
undoubtedly be
extremely difficult,
and
criminologists who benefit from their roles
as servants of the political state would
surely resist changes that threaten their
enterprise.
But I do not think these
obstacles are impossible to overcome.
The necessary changes would not only be
in the form of curriculum changes, or
modifications in research topics, strategies,
theory, and orientation.
Tg
wo uld h&
fundnalchang
isn 9p.1=.
Criminology
would no longer be simply a science of
people, but a discipline
resource for
people. Criminology would no longer be an
enterprise in the service of governments, but
a field devoted to the study and critique of
government.
Criminology would no longer
devote its investigations to the benefit of
elites, but a means for a radical appraisal
of elitism. Criminology would no longer rest
its subject matter on the foundations of
criminal law, but would be devoted to the
analyses of law and legal oppression. By so
doing criminology would cease to be merely
another social science, another academic
discipline, another cog in the machinery of
modern bureaucracies and governments. Rather
criminology
would
become
a
humanistic
enterprise,
an
instrument
for
human
betterment, freedom, and fulfillment.
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